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Abstract
C++ remains a widely used programming language, despite
retaining many unsafe features from C. These unsafe fea-
tures often lead to violations of type and memory safety,
which manifest as buffer overflows, use-after-free vulner-
abilities, or abstraction violations. Malicious attackers are
able to exploit such violations to compromise application
and system security. This paper introduces Ironclad C++, an
approach to bring the benefits of type and memory safety
to C++. Ironclad C++ is, in essence, a library-augmented
type-safe subset of C++. All Ironclad C++ programs are
valid C++ programs, and thus Ironclad C++ programs can be
compiled using standard, off-the-shelf C++ compilers. How-
ever, not all valid C++ programs are valid Ironclad C++ pro-
grams. To determine whether or not a C++ program is a valid
Ironclad C++ program, Ironclad C++ uses a syntactic source
code validator that statically prevents the use of unsafe C++
features. For properties that are difficult to check statically
Ironclad C++ applies dynamic checking to enforce memory
safety using templated smart pointer classes. Drawing from
years of research on enforcing memory safety, Ironclad C++
utilizes and improves upon prior techniques to significantly
reduce the overhead of enforcing memory safety in C++.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of this approach, we
translate (with the assistance of a semi-automatic refactor-
ing tool) and test a set of performance benchmarks, multiple
bug-detection suites, and the open-source database leveldb.
These benchmarks incur a performance overhead of 12% on
average as compared to the unsafe original C++ code, which
is small compared to prior approaches for providing com-
prehensive memory safety in C and C++.
1. Introduction
C and C++ are widely used programming languages for im-
plementing web browsers, native mobile applications, com-
pilers, databases, and other infrastructure software [28]. C
and C++ provide efficiency and low-level control, but these
advantages come at the well-known cost of lack of memory
and type safety. This unsafety allows programming errors
such as buffer overflows (accessing location beyond the ob-
ject or array bounds), use-after-free errors (accessing mem-
ory locations that have been freed), and erroneous type casts
to cause arbitrary memory corruption and break program-
ming abstractions. More dangerously, malicious attackers
exploit such bugs to compromise system security [25].
Source
Code Validator
C++ Compiler
(unmodified)
Is Valid?
Executable
No
Yes (Safe)
Refactor Code
Ironclad
Library
Figure 1. Workflow for Coding with Ironclad C++
Recognizing this problem, many approaches have been
proposed to prevent memory safety violations or even en-
force full memory safety in C and C-like languages [2, 4,
9, 10, 12, 13, 16, 20–22, 27, 31]. Collectively, these prior
works identified several key principles for bringing safety ef-
ficiently to C. However, one challenge in making C memory
safe is that C provides limited language support for creating
type-safe programming abstractions. In contrast, although
C++ includes many unsafe features, C++ does provide ad-
vanced constructs that enable type-safe programming, such
as templates and dynamically checked type-casts.
This paper presents Ironclad C++, an approach to bring
comprehensive memory and type safety to C++. Ironclad
C++ is, in essence, a library-augmented type-safe subset of
C++. As such, an Ironclad C++ program is a valid C++
program (but not all C++ programs are valid Ironclad C++
programs). Dynamic checking is implemented in a “smart
pointer” library, so no additional language extensions or
compiler changes are required. As shown in Figure 1, Iron-
clad C++ code is compiled using an unmodified off-the-shelf
C++ compiler but Ironclad C++ includes a syntactic valida-
tion pass that checks whether the input is a legal program.
In the following paragraphs, we describe some key prin-
ciples of efficient type safety for C, survey their implemen-
tations in prior work, and describe how these principles can
be brought to C++ by leveraging existing language features.
Differentiating array pointers from non-array point-
ers. Several prior memory safety proposals have recog-
nized the performance benefit of distinguishing between a
pointer to an array (which requires bounds information) ver-
sus a pointer to non-array (a.k.a. singleton) object (which
does not). Doing so typically requires whole-program anal-
ysis at compile time or language extensions. For example,
CCured [22] uses a whole-program type inference at com-
pile time to distinguish between singleton and array pointers,
Cyclone [16] introduces different type decorators, and some
Ironclad C++: A Library-Augmented Type-Safe Subset of C++ 1
pool allocation approaches [9] create type-homogeneous
pools of singleton objects. Systems without such differen-
tiation implicitly treat all pointers as array pointers, adding
unnecessary space and time overheads for bounds checking.
Ironclad C++ captures this differentiation between single-
ton and array pointers without language extension or whole-
program analysis during each compilation by using the well-
known C++ technique of smart pointers [1, 2, 8]. Smart
pointers leverage C++’s template and operator overloading
constructs, and they have previously been used to dynam-
ically insert safety checks [2] or perform reference count-
ing [8] on pointer operations. Ironclad C++ requires that all
bare C++ pointer types be replaced with one from a suite of
smart pointers, some of which include bounds information
and thus support pointer arithmetic and indexing (for array
pointers) and some that avoid the bounds checking overhead
(for singleton pointers). The distinction between singleton
and array smart pointer types allows their overloaded oper-
ators to perform the minimum dynamic checking necessary
to detect bounds violations based on the type of the pointer.
Enforcing strong typing. C’s use of void* and unchecked
type casts results in either pessimistic typing assumptions
that can significantly increase the overhead of dynamic
checking [20, 24] and/or the failure to detect all memory
safety violations. Disallowing unsafe casts in C reduces
checking overhead, but doing so has typically required aug-
menting the C language in some way. For example, Cyclone
found it necessary to support generics, CCured adds RTTI
(run-time type information) pointers, and both support struc-
tural subtyping. However, C++ already provides alternatives
to C’s unsafe constructs (for example, templates and class
hierarchies). Yet, to facilitate adoption, C++ inherited many
of C’s unsafe constructs. Ironclad C++ takes a different ap-
proach and explicitly enforces strong typing by disallowing
legacy type-unsafe constructs and requiring that all pointer
type-cast operations are either known to be safe statically
or checked dynamically (by building upon C++’s existing
dynamic_cast construct).
Heap-safety through conservative garbage collection.
Ironclad C++’s smart pointers provide strong typing and
bounds safety, but they do not prevent use-after-free er-
rors. To avoid the overhead of reference counting [12] or
use-after-free checking [2, 21, 31], Ironclad C++ facilitates
the use of conservative garbage collection [7] by target-
ing two challenges of using conservative GC to enforce
safety. Conservative collection can lead to non-deterministic
memory leaks (due to non-pointer data that “looks” like
a pointer) [5, 26]. To reduce such memory leaks due to
conservative garbage collection, Ironclad C++ supports
heap-precise garbage collection. Inspired by prior work
on mostly-copying and more-precise conservative garbage
collection [3, 11, 14, 26], Ironclad’s collector treats the
roots conservatively but supports the precise identification of
pointers in heap objects by employing mark() class meth-
ods to precisely identify pointer fields and pointer containing
members.
Facilitating stack-allocation safety. Garbage collection
alone fails to prevent dangling pointers to the stack ob-
jects. In recognition of this problem, CCured prevents use-
after-free errors to stack objects by selectively converting
escaping stack-allocated objects into heap-allocated objects
(a.k.a. heapification), which unfortunately introduces signif-
icant performance overheads in some programs [22]. To pre-
vent use-after-free errors for stack allocated memory with-
out the performance penalties of heapification, this paper
introduces hybrid static-dynamic checking of stack pointer
lifetimes. The hybrid checking in Ironclad C++ avoids the
performance overheads of heapification with simple static
checking and limited dynamic checking.
Validating conformance statically. Statically validating
that code conforms to the rules of Ironclad C++ is paramount
for ensuring safety. Without some form of static validation,
prior smart pointers schemes could not alone provide a guar-
antee of safety because unsafe constructs can still be used
outside of the use of smart pointers and smart pointers can
be used incorrectly. Our current prototype divides this re-
sponsibility between two checkers. First, we created a static
code validator that checks basic syntactic properties of the
program to ensure that it conforms to the Ironclad C++ sub-
set (e.g. no raw pointers). Second, after carefully precluding
unsafe constructs with the validator, we then leverage the
existing C++ type checker to complete the remaining check-
ing of type safety. This use of strong static validation distin-
guishes Ironclad C++’s approach from other non-validated
smart pointer approaches [2, 8] and mark methods for pre-
cise garbage collection [3, 26].
Experimentally evaluating Ironclad C++. To evaluate
practicality and performance, we refactored several C/C++
programs—over 50k lines in total—into Ironclad C++. We
performed this translation with a semi-automatic refactoring
tool we created to assist in this conversion, and we report
our experiences converting these programs. We also con-
verted multiple test suites designed for evaluating memory
safety bug detectors, which confirmed that Ironclad C++
does successfully detect memory access violations. Using
performance-oriented benchmarks, we measured an average
performance overhead of 12% for enforcing complete type
and memory safety.
This paper describes Ironclad C++ and reports on our ex-
perience programming in this type-safe C++, including:
• a C++ smart pointer library that efficiently and compre-
hensively enforces strong typing and bounds safety,
• a hybrid static–dynamic checking technique that prevents
use-after-free errors for stack objects, without requiring
costly heap allocation,
• an opt-in, source-level heap-precise garbage collector de-
signed to reduce memory leaks due to conservative GC,
• tools for semi-automated refactoring of existing C and
C++ code into the Ironclad subset of C++ and a validator
that enforces compliance with that subset, and
• experimental evaluation of the performance overheads of
this approach to enforce memory safety.
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Type Capabilities Safety Checks
ptr Dereference Null Check
lptr Dereference Null Check
Receive address-of object Lifetime Check
Receive this pointer Lifetime Check
aptr Dereference Bounds Check
Index Bounds Check
Arithmetic No Check†
laptr Dereference Bounds Check
Receive address-of object Lifetime Check
Receive this pointer Lifetime Check
Hold static-sized array Lifetime Check
Index Bounds Check
Arithmetic No Check†
†: arbitrary pointer arithmetic is allowed, but is bounds
checked when the array pointer is dereferenced
Table 1. This table details the capabilities and safety checks
required for each pointer type. As more letters are added
to the type, the capabilities increase, but the efficiency de-
creases due to additional required checks.
2. Bounds Checking & Strong Static Typing
The Ironclad dialect of C++ is formed by first providing safe
idioms via the Ironclad C++ library (e.g., the smart pointers
described in Table 1) and then disallowing the use of unsafe
language features (e.g., disallowing the use of raw pointers).
In this way, Ironclad C++ brings memory and type safety to
C++ using a combination of static code validation, the stan-
dard C++ type checker, and dynamic safety checks. A code
validator, described in Section 6, statically enforces that dis-
allowed constructs are not used. This section first describes
safety without considering arrays or memory deallocation
(Section 2.1), then adds support for arrays and pointer arith-
metic (Section 2.2). Further sections discuss memory deallo-
cation safety for the heap (Section 3) and stack (Section 4).
2.1 Strong Static Typing with ptr<T>
Ironclad C++ requires that all raw C++ pointer types are
replaced with templated smart pointer types. For referring
to singleton (non-array) objects, Ironclad C++ provides the
ptr<T> class. Because new returns a raw pointer, Ironclad
C++ provides a replacement for performing heap allocation,
new_obj<T>(args), which uses new internally but returns
a ptr<T> (rather than returning a T*). Accordingly, the fol-
lowing C++ code:
Rectangle* r = new Rectangle(2, 5);
Would be rewritten in Ironclad C++ as:
ptr<Rectangle> r = new_obj<Rectangle>(2, 5);
C++11’s variadic templates allow new_obj to accept arbi-
trary arguments to pass along to the underlying object con-
structor.
Rule (Pointers). All pointer types are transformed to ptr<T>
(or one of its variants, described below) provided by the
Ironclad C++ library. Raw pointers are disallowed.
Supporting type casts safely. By disallowing raw point-
ers, Ironclad C++ also implicitly disallows both void*
pointers and unsafe pointer-to-pointer casts. To support safe
pointer-to-pointer casts, Ironclad C++ provides a cast<T>
function template to safely cast a ptr to a ptr<T>. The
cast<T>(...) function is a wrapper over C++’s existing
dynamic_cast operation, which is used to cast between
members of a class hierarchy. Casts between incompatible
types will be caught either: (1) during compilation when the
template is instantiated (e.g., when attempting a cast that
can be proven invalid during type-checking) or (2) when
the underlying dynamic_cast fails at runtime due to an in-
compatible type, setting the resulting pointer to NULL. Cast-
ing from void* or integers to a pointer is not supported
by C++’s dynamic_cast, so this use of dynamic_cast
statically enforces that a ptr cannot be created from an inte-
ger or void* pointer. Uses of void* pointers can generally
be eliminated by refactoring the code to use inheritance or
templates (e.g., to implement generic containers, which is
one use-case of void*). Note that Ironclad C++ does not
restrict cast operations (type conversions) on non-pointer
types, such as ints and doubles, because such type con-
versions are well-defined and do not violate memory safety.
For example, if a variable is cast from a negative int to
an unsigned int and then used as an index into an array,
the possibly out-of-bounds index will be caught by Iron-
clad C++’s dynamic checks. Thus, type-conversions do not
violate memory safety in Ironclad C++.
Rule (Pointer Casts). Pointer casts must use cast<U>(...),
provided by the Ironclad C++ library.
C-style unions are not allowed in Ironclad C++ because,
unlike type-casts on non-pointer types, the implicit cast be-
tween types that occurs through the use of a union can lead
to undefined behavior [15]. Unions are less prevalent in C++
compared to C because only POD (plain old data) types can
be used in unions.
Rule (Unions). Unions are disallowed in Ironclad C++.
Dynamic NULL checking. As ptr<T> pointers may point
only to singleton objects (arrays and pointer arithmetic are
handled in the next subsection), the ptr<T> class explicitly
does not overload the operators for performing array index-
ing and pointer arithmetic, so the standard C++ type checker
disallows such operations during compilation. Thus, the only
possible illegal memory access via a ptr is dereferencing the
NULL pointer. The overloaded dereference operations (* and
->) in ptr check for NULL prior to performing the derefer-
ence. Though a NULL dereference can be detected as a seg-
mentation fault, the explicit check is necessary to prevent
field accesses on NULL pointers. If a program attempts to ac-
cess the member foo->x (foo == NULL) of type struct
Foo{int A[1000000]; int x;}, the address accessed is
actually 0x3D0900. If that address is mapped, a SEGFAULT
will not occur. Checking for NULL before dereference also
catches the dereference of a ptr that resulted from an in-
valid dynamically checked pointer cast.
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Example: Strong Static Typing
float radius(Shape * shape){
Circle * circle = static_cast<Circle>(shape);
return circle->radius;
}
float radius(ptr<Shape> shape){
ptr<Circle> circle = cast<Circle>(shape);
return circle->radius;
}
Example: Bounds Checking
float * computeArea(Shape * shapes, int N){
float * areas = new float[N];
for(int i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
float r = radius(shapes);
areas[i] = PI * (r * r);
shapes++;
}
return areas;
}
aptr<float> computeArea(aptr<Shape> shapes, int N){
aptr<float> areas = new_array<float>(N);
for(int i = 0; i < N; ++i) {
float r = radius(shapes);
areas[i] = PI * (r * r);
shapes++;
}
return areas;
}
Example: Stack Allocation Safety
void compute(int * p, int * q){
int x = 0;
p = q;
p = &x;
}
void create() {
int * p, * q;
compute(p,q);
}
void compute(lptr<int> & p, lptr<int> & q){
int x = 0;
p = q; // Same scope, check passes
p = &x; // Deeper scope, check fails
}
void create() {
lptr<int> p, q;
compute(p,q);
}
Figure 2. Comparison of C++ syntax (left) and Ironclad C++ syntax (right).
2.2 Bounds Checking with aptr<T>
Ironclad C++ supports static-sized arrays, dynamic-sized ar-
rays, and pointer arithmetic by providing the array<T,N>
and aptr<T> (“array pointer”) classes. For static-sized ar-
rays, the Ironclad C++ library provides a templated array
class array<T,N>. This class overrides the index operator
and checks that the requested index (an unsigned int) is
less than N before returning the requested element. To create
an array<T,N>, the size N of the allocated array must be
known at compile time.
Rule (Static-sized Arrays). All static-sized arrays must be
replaced by array<T,N>.
To support dynamic-sized arrays, Ironclad C++ provides
an aptr<T> class. The aptr<T> class replaces raw pointers
for referring to either dynamically or statically sized arrays.
To perform the necessary bounds checking, each aptr is a
three-element fat pointer with a pointer to the base of the
array, the current index, and the maximum index. A bounds
check is performed on each dereference or array index oper-
ation. This bounds check will fail if the pointer is NULL, so
a separate NULL check is not needed. Arbitrary pointer arith-
metic is allowed, and the bounds check during dereference
and array indexing are sufficient to detect invalid pointer
arithmetic. To heap allocate new dynamically sized arrays,
the Ironclad C++ library provides new_array<T>(size)
function, which returns an aptr<T> created by calling new.
Accordingly, the following C++ code:
Foo* f = new Foo[number];
Would be rewritten in Ironclad C++ as:
aptr<Foo> f = new_array<Foo>(number);
Rule (Array Pointers). Pointers to dynamic and static arrays
must be replaced by aptr<T>.
Ironclad C++ provides both ptr<T> and aptr<T> be-
cause they provide different tradeoffs: ptr does not provide
indexing or pointer arithmetic operators, but it avoids the
performance and storage overheads incurred by the bounds
checking for aptr. The Ironclad C++ library provides an im-
plicit conversion from aptr<T> to ptr<T>, allowing a ptr
to point to a single element of an array. During such a con-
version, if the aptr is invalid (not in bounds) the ptr is set
to NULL.
2.3 Pointer initialization
If pointers were allowed to be uninitialized, a pointer could
contain garbage and point to arbitrary memory. Therefore,
Ironclad C++ ensures that pointers are properly initialized by
initializing the underlying raw pointer to NULL in the default
constructor for each smart pointer class.
In one particularly insidious corner case, the order of ini-
tialization of members of a class may allow a smart pointer
to be dereferenced before its constructor has been called:
class Foo{
int x;
ptr<int> y;
Foo() : x(*y){}
};
To ensure proper initialization, smart pointer initializers
must appear in an initializer list before any dereference of
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the smart pointer, any use of the this pointer as a func-
tion argument, and any method calls. The static validator
enforces this requirement.
Rule (Init.). A ptr<T> must be initialized before use.
2.4 The C Standard Library
. The C Standard Library contains utility functions, standard
types, I/O functions, functions on C-strings (char *), and
other functionality. To ensure safety, Ironclad C++ disallows
the use of some of the available headers (e.g. <csetjmp>)
and replaces others with safe versions. A few of the C stan-
dard library headers contain functions that consume C-string
parameters without checking to see if the C-string is properly
null terminated or large enough to perform the operation.
Even the functions in <cstring> that take a size parame-
ter, such as strncpy, can violate memory safety if the size
parameter is incorrect.
Ironclad C++ provides safe functions to replace each of
these unsafe functions. These safe functions take aptr<char>
parameters instead of char* and check that the inputs are
null-terminated and within the specified bounds. Two spe-
cific functions — memset and memcpy — are unsafe in
C++. memset can accidentally overwrite virtual pointers;
memcpy ignores any effects that copy constructors might
have. Ironclad C++ replaces memset and memcpy with the
functions zero<T> and copy<T>. The zero function iter-
ates through the input array and sets each element to 0. The
copy function assigns each element of the source array to
the corresponding element in the destination array. To im-
prove performance, the zero and copy functions have hand-
optimized template specializations for standard data types,
such as char.
The <cstdio> header contains variable argument func-
tions that rely on the programmer to provide a correct format
string. In C++11, the unsafe use of va_list can be replaced
by the type-safe use of variadic templates. Using variadic
templates, Ironclad C++ checks that the number and type of
arguments provided to functions such as printf and scanf
matches the arguments expected by the format string.
Rule (C Standard Library Functions). Uses of unsafe C
Standard Library functions must be replaced with their
corresponding safe variant (e.g. strlen(const char *) with
safe strlen(aptr<const char>).
3. Support for Heap-Precise Garbage
Collection
Along with strong typing and bounds checking, dealloca-
tion safety (i.e., no dangling pointers) is the final require-
ment for complete type and memory safety. To prevent dan-
gling pointers to heap allocated objects, Ironclad C++ uses
a conservative garbage collector to delay deallocation until
a time at which it is known to be safe.1 Garbage collection
prevents dangling pointers without the overheads associated
1 For domains in which garbage collection is not applicable, Iron-
clad C++ still provides type and bounds safety.
with dynamic checking on each pointer dereference [2, 21]
or maintaining reference counts [12]. In most of the bench-
marks we tested, conservative garbage collection is fast and
incurs low memory overheads (see Section 8). However, one
concern with conservative garbage is memory leaks due to
non-pointer data that “looks” like a pointer [14, 26, 29].
Several approaches have been proposed to mitigate this
problem. The Boehm-Demers-Weiser collector performs
blacklisting to avoid allocating on pages that have previ-
ously been pointed to by non-pointer data [7]. It also pro-
vides an interface for providing precise pointer identifica-
tion bitmap descriptors for allocated data [5]. A proposal
was put forth (though not accepted) for C++11 that would
have added keywords to C++ for precise identification of
specified gc_strict classes [6]. Prior approaches have pro-
posed methods for precisely identifying pointers in the heap
either by tracking pointers on creation and destruction [11]
or calling tool-generated or user-defined methods for pre-
cisely identifying an object’s pointer and pointer containing
members [3, 26].
Building on these prior works, Ironclad C++ adopts opt-
in heap-precise garbage collection. Ironclad C++’s heap-
precise garbage collector treats the program roots conser-
vatively (e.g., stack, registers, and globals) but precisely
marks heap allocations using optional user-defined mark
methods. To support incremental adoption, heap allocations
are marked conservatively by default, but if the type being
allocated is a precise type (i.e., the programmer has added
a mark() method and the class inherits non-virtually from
the IroncladPreciseGC class), the garbage collector uses
the mark() method during collection to precisely identify
pointers and pointer-containing members in the object. A
class’s mark() method must call mark() on all its pointer
fields, object fields, and base classes from which it inher-
its. Although provided by the programmer, unlike prior sys-
tems that utilize programmer-supplied marking [3, 26], each
mark() method is statically verified for correctness by the
Ironclad C++ validator (Section 6). For allocating arrays of
primitive data types, Ironclad C++ includes template special-
izations that informs the garbage collector that the allocation
contains no pointers and thus does not need to be marked.
4. Stack Deallocation Safety via lptr
Although garbage collection prevents all dangling pointers
to objects on the heap, it does not protect against dangling
pointers to stack-allocated objects. One way to prevent such
errors is to forgo some of the efficiency benefits of stack allo-
cation by limiting the use of stack allocation to non-escaping
objects only (a.k.a. heapification). To avoid the performance
penalties of heapification, Ironclad C++ provides additional
templated smart pointers that, cooperatively with the static
code validator and C++ type checker, uses dynamic lifetime
checking to prevent use-after-free errors for stack allocations
while avoiding heapification in almost all cases.
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4.1 The Perils of Heapification
A common approach for preventing use-after-free errors for
stack allocations in garbage collected system is simply to
restrict stack allocations by employing heapification [22],
which is the process of heap-allocating an object that was
originally allocated on the stack. Heapification enforces
deallocation safety by conservatively disallowing any object
whose address might escape the function from being allo-
cated on the stack. For example, without inter-procedural
analysis, heapification requires heap allocation of any object
whose address is passed into a function. This is a particu-
lar challenge for C++ codes, because object methods and
constructors are implicitly passed the address of the object
(the this pointer), thus disallowing stack allocation of al-
most all objects unless inter-procedural analysis could prove
otherwise. Unfortunately, heapification results in significant
performance degradations in some cases (see Section 8.5).
4.2 Dynamic Lifetime Checking
To reduce the need for heapification, Ironclad C++ provides
stack allocation safety by allowing pointers to stack alloca-
tions to escape but controlling how the escaped pointers are
used during execution. It does this by introducing two ad-
ditional templated pointer classes, lptr<T> and laptr<T>,
called local pointers. Prior work on preventing use-after-free
errors has introduced some notion of a local pointer [10, 18],
but these efforts have been focused on purely static enforce-
ment through sophisticated program analyses. Local pointers
in Ironclad C++ combine static enforcement and dynamic
checking, providing flexibility and simplifying the necessary
analysis. Local pointers, and the rules regarding their use, al-
low Ironclad C++ to enforce the following invariant:
Invariant (Pointer lifetime). The lifetime of a pointer may
not exceed the lifetime of the value that it points to.
For pointers to the heap, this invariant is enforced through
the use of garbage collection, which guarantees that a heap
allocation will not be deallocated while a reference to it re-
mains. For the stack, Ironclad C++ must ensure that when
the address within a stack frame escapes, the address does
not escape to a pointer with a longer lifetime than the stack
frame.
Local pointers record the lower bound on addresses that
they may point to.2 Through a combination of static restric-
tions and dynamic checks, these local pointers are allowed
to point only to heap-allocated values or values at the same
level or above in the call stack. In the concrete implementa-
tion, shown in Figure 3, a local pointer records the current
stack pointer in its lowerBound field upon construction. The
local pointer then applies a dynamic check on pointer assign-
ment (by overloading the assignment operator) to determine
if it will outlive its new referent.
Local pointers ensure that each assignment into or out
of the local pointer will not create a dangling reference.
2 The use of “lower” here assumes that a stack grows down through
its memory region.
template<typename T> class lptr {
T * data;
size_t lowerBound;
lptr(T * newData) : data(newData) {
lowerBound = getCurrentStackPointer();
if(newData < lowerBound) {
// Points to an infinite lifetime object
lowerBound |= 1;
}
}
operator ptr<T> () {
// Check that object has infinite lifetime
if( lowerBound & 1 == 0 ) exit(-1);
...
}
lptr<T>& operator= (lptr other) {
if(other.data != NULL &&
(other.lowerBound & 1) == 0 &&
(lowerBound ^ 1) > other.data) exit(-1);
...
}
};
Figure 3. Pseudo-C++ implementation of local pointer
checking. Casts necessary for type checking have been re-
moved for clarity.
For all stack safety checks, pointers of type aptr<T> and
ptr<T> are assumed to hold only addresses that point to val-
ues stored in the heap or globals. The checks required for
local pointers can be split into the following cases.
Case: Assign from ptr<T> into lptr<T>
In this case, the address being assigned into the lptr
points to the heap or globals. Therefore, the address can
be safely assigned into the lptr, and a flag in the lptr
is set to indicate that it currently holds the address of a
heap or global value.
Case: Assign from lptr<T> into ptr<T>
To assign from an lptr into a ptr, the address currently
held by the lptr must point to a heap or global value.
As explained in the previous case, a flag bit in the lptr
is set when it receives the address of a heap or global
value. Therefore, if the flag bit is set, the address may be
assigned into the ptr. If the flag bit is not set, then the
address held by the lptr points to a value stored on the
stack and cannot be held by a ptr, so the check fails.
Case: Assign from lptr<T> into lptr<T>
In this case, the address held by the source lptr is as-
signed into the destination lptr. If the source lptr cur-
rently points to a heap or global value, execution pro-
ceeds as in the first case. If not, the destination lptr must
check that the address held by the source lptr is not be-
low the minimum address allowed to be held by the des-
tination lptr, which is defined by the destination lptr’s
lower-bound.
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void Acquire(Logger * logger){
obj->logger = logger;
}
void Release(){
obj->logger = NULL;
}
void f(){
Logger logger;
Acquire(&logger);
...
Release();
}
Figure 4. Case in leveldb under which dynamic lifetime
checking could not avoid heapification
Rule (Stack Pointers). Any pointer to stack object must be
held by an laptr or lptr.
To ensure the correct use of local pointers, Ironclad C++
places a few restrictions on where local pointers may be
used. First, a function may not return a local pointer. Sec-
ond, a local pointer may not be allocated on the heap. From
the second restriction, it follows that a local pointer may not
be declared in a struct or class because Ironclad C++ does
not restrict in which memory space an object may be allo-
cated.
Rule (Local Pointer Return). A local pointer may not be
returned from a function.
Rule (Local Pointer Location). A local pointer may not exist
on the heap.
With the dynamic lifetime checks described above and
these few restrictions placed on the static use of local point-
ers, Ironclad C++ provides deallocation safety for stack ob-
jects without the need for heapification in most situations.
For example, stack-allocated arrays can be passed to nested
functions without requiring heapification. For the codes we
examined, the single example requiring heapification oc-
curred in our conversion of the benchmark leveldb. The
relevant code is shown in Figure 4. Here, the address of
a stack value is stored in the field of a heap object, which
caused the local pointer assignment check to fail at runtime.
Even though the code does not actually create a dangling
reference, Ironclad C++ could not provide this guarantee.
Therefore, the programmer must heap-allocate the object to
ensure safety.
References References in C++ (T&) are similar to pointers
but differ in a few ways that allow them to be treated dif-
ferently in Ironclad C++. References are not allowed to be
NULL and must therefore be initialized as soon as they are
declared. In Ironclad C++, the creation of a NULL reference
is not possible. Once a reference has been initialized, the lo-
cation that the reference points to cannot change. Thus, Iron-
clad C++ needs to prevent the initialization of a reference to
memory that is currently invalid.
Ironclad C++ prohibits the use of reference class mem-
bers due to the possible unsafety from initializer lists. Other-
wise, a class member with reference type of an object on the
heap could be initialized to point to a stack location through
the use of a constructor initializer list. Reference class mem-
bers are rare in C++ code and generally discouraged because
the fact that they cannot be reseated makes them inflexible.
For example, an assignment operator cannot properly assign
a new location to a reference. We encountered only a sin-
gle case in astar in which we refactored a reference class
member to be a ptr instead.
Rule (Reference Class Members). Reference class members
are disallowed.
Ironclad C++ allows references to be used as function
return values, mainly to support common code idioms, in-
cluding chaining function or method calls on an object (e.g.
std::cout) but restricts the expressions that can be re-
turned as references. In general, any value with a lifetime
that will persist through the function or method call may be
returned safely. The result of the dereference of an aptr or a
ptr can be returned as a reference because the referred loca-
tion must be in the heap or globals. Ironclad C++ limits the
expressions that may be returned by reference to reference
function parameters, the dereference of the this pointer,
and class members (of the class that the method was called
on). Intuitively, these expressions are allowed because the
location they point to must have a lifetime that is at least as
long as the lifetime of the return value.
Rule (Reference Return Values). A reference return value
may only be initialized from the dereference of an aptr or a
ptr, from a reference function parameter, from the derefer-
ence of the this pointer, or from a class member.
Although we did not identify any such cases in our bench-
marks, it is possible that a valid program will not conform to
the above static restrictions on reference return values. For
any such cases, Ironclad C++ provides the ref<T> class,
which is used as a return value. The ref<T> class provides
nothing other than an implicit conversion to a T&, which per-
forms a dynamic check, similar to the local pointer dynamic
check, to ensure that the location held by the ref<T> refers
to valid memory.
5. Formalizing the Pointer Lifetime Invariant
To ensure that this collection of rules satisfies the pointer
lifetime invariant, we prove that the invariant is maintained
during execution using a formalism of a core fragment of
Ironclad C++ called Core Ironclad. For the sake of brevity,
this paper includes only those features of Core Ironclad that
deal with the pointer lifetime invariant. For a complete ac-
count of Core Ironclad, including a complete language de-
scription and full proofs of type safety, please see our tech-
nical report draft.3
5.1 Locations and the Store
Core Ironclad consists of statements s and expressions e ,
evaluated in a context ∆ with classes (omitting inheritance)
3 The Core Ironclad TR is available at http://goo.gl/nbOqO.
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and methods. The store Σ contains both the stack and the
heap which maps locations ` to values v . A value is tagged
as being either a ptr or an lptr, along with a pointer-value,
pv , which is either a valid location or null. Locations have
the form xn@y1 .. ym where xn is a base location with name
x and store level n , and y1 .. ym is a path in the style of
Rossie and Friedman [17]. The heap is located at store index
0 and the stack grows with increasing indices starting at in-
dex 1. The store height index n disambiguates between two
variables with the same name but existing in different stack
frames.
Paths allow locations to refer to the inner member of an
object. For example, consider the following definitions:
structC { ptr〈C 〉 a; };
structB {C c; };
A declaration B x; in the main function creates a B object
that lives at base location x 1. The location x1@c.a refers to
the a field of the C sub-object within B.
To simplify the system and to support temporary objects,
expressions evaluate to locations. The value denoted by the
expression is stored at the location the expression evaluates
to. Thus, we can use the same evaluation relation for expres-
sions on either side of an assignment.
5.2 Pointer Semantics
With respect to the pointer lifetime invariant, the most inter-
esting rules concern the assignment of pointers as well as the
constraints we place on their values in the store. The simplest
case is when we assign between two ptr values, where we
simply overwrite the left-hand pointer with the right-hand
pointer in the store.
Σ(`1) = ptr (pv1) Σ(`2) = ptr (pv2)
Σ′ = Σ [`1 7→ ptr (pv2)]
(Σ, `1 = `2) −→
stmt
n
∆(Σ
′, skip)
When assigning a (non-null) lptr to a ptr, we verify that the
lptr does indeed point to the heap by checking that the store
index of the location referred to by the lptr is 0.
Σ(`1) = ptr (pv1) Σ(`2) = lptr (x
0@pi)
Σ′ = Σ [`1 7→ ptr (x 0@pi)]
(Σ, `1 = `2) −→
stmt
n
∆(Σ
′, skip)
Finally, when assigning (non-null) lptrs, the dynamic check
ensures that the lptr being assigned to out-lives the location
it receives by comparing the appropriate store indices.
Σ(x1
n1@pi1) = lptr (pv1)
Σ(`2) = lptr (x2
n2@pi2)
Σ′ = Σ [x1n1@pi1 7→ lptr (x2n2@pi2)] n2 ≤ n1
(Σ, x1
n1@pi1 = `2) −→
stmt
n
∆(Σ
′, skip)
In addition to standard typing rules for statements and
expressions, Core Ironclad enforces a consistency judgment
over the store by way of a store typing Ψ which maps loca-
tions to types τ . In particular, two of these binding consis-
tency rules for pointers capture the pointer lifetime invariant.
The first rule concerns ptrs and requires that the location
pointed to by the ptr is on the heap (at index 0).
Σ(xn@pi) = ptr (x ′n
′
@pi′) n ′ = 0
Ψ(x ′n
′
@pi′) = τ
Ψ; Σ s`t1 x
n@pi : ptr〈τ〉 ok
The second rule concerns lptrs and requires that lptrs only
exist at base locations without paths (not embedded within a
class) and that the location pointed to by a particular lptr is
in the same stack frame or a lower one.
Σ(xn@ ) = lptr (x ′n
′
@pi′) n ′ ≤ n
Ψ(x ′n
′
@pi′) = τ
Ψ; Σ s`t1 x
n@ : lptr〈τ〉 ok
5.3 Statement of Theorem
Invariant (Pointer lifetime). For all bindings of the form
[x1
n1@pi1 7→ ptr (pv)] and [x1n1@pi1 7→ lptr (pv)] in Σ, if
pv = x2
n2@pi2 (i.e., is non-null) then n2 ≤ n1.
We now can present our theorem that states that the
pointer lifetime invariant is preserved by execution. We
make use of the summary judgment wf (∆,Ψ,Σ, k), which
asserts that the class and method context ∆, the store typing
Ψ, and the store Σ are all consistent with one another. These
checks also include the pointer lifetime invariant. Therefore,
wf (∆,Ψ,Σ, k) implies that the pointer lifetime invariant
holds for Σ.
Theorem (Pointer lifetime invariant is preserved). If
wf (∆,Ψ,Σ, k), Ψ `∆;nstmt s ok, and (Σ, s) −→stmt
n
∆(Σ
′, s ′),
where k is the maximum stack height used within the state-
ment s , then the pointer lifetime invariant holds in the store
Σ′.
This theorem is a straightforward corollary of type preser-
vation. That is, the standard type preservation lemma tells us
that the wf judgment is preserved by evaluation.
Theorem (Preservation).
1. If wf (∆,Ψ,Σ, |s| + n), Ψ `∆;nstmt s ok, and (Σ, s) −→stmt
n
∆(Σ
′, s ′), then there exists Ψ′ such thatwf (∆,Ψ′,Σ′, |s|+
n), Ψ `∆;nstmt s ′ ok, and Ψ ⊆n Ψ′.
2. If wf (∆,Ψ,Σ, |e| + n), Ψ `∆;nexp e : τ , and (Σ, e) −→exp
n
∆(Σ
′, e ′), then there exists Ψ′ such thatwf (∆,Ψ′,Σ′, |e|+
n), Ψ′ `∆;nexp e ′ : τ , and Ψ ⊆n Ψ′.
We prove preservation at stack height |s|+n (respectively
|e| + n) where n is the height of the stack up to statement
s (respectively e) and |s| (respectively |e|) is the number
of additional stack frames embedded in the subject of the
evaluation. The extra condition Ψ ⊆n Ψ′ says that new store
typing Ψ′ has all the bindings of the old store typing Ψ up
to stack height n. The complete details of the proofs of these
theorems can be found in our companion technical report.
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6. Validator for Ironclad C++
Although many of the rules of Ironclad C++ are simple
enough for a well-intentioned programmer to follow un-
aided, ensuring safety requires the use of a static syntac-
tic validation tool to certify the code’s conformance to the
Ironclad C++ subset. The validator ensures that any mem-
ory/type safety violation will be prevented by either: (1)
the standard C++ type checker or (2) the dynamic checks
performed by the smart pointers. Specifically, the valida-
tor checks that no raw pointer or union types remain. For
heap-precise garbage collection, the validator ensures that
user-defined mark() methods correctly identify all pointers,
pointer containing members, and inherited base classes of
each precisely marked class. To prevent dangling pointers
to stack objects via dynamic lifetime checking, the valida-
tor checks that all uses of address-of, the this pointer, and
conversions from stack arrays to pointers immediately enter
an lptr or laptr. The syntactic validator examines the ini-
tializer lists for each class constructor to ensure that pointer
and reference class members are safely initialized. Finally,
the validator checks that expressions returned by reference
match one of the following constructs: dereference of an
aptr or ptr, a reference parameter, the dereference of the
this pointer, or a class member.
Once the code passes the static syntactic validator, the
C++ type-checker then statically enforces the remaining
type safety properties. For example, unsafe casts and void*
will not type-check in validated code because Ironclad C++
smart pointers explicitly do not support them. Similarly, ar-
ray indexing and pointer arithmetic operators are not over-
loaded on the ptr<T> class, ensuring the disallowed use of
such operators will be caught during compilation.
Our implementation of the static validator builds upon
LLVM’s Clang compiler front-end. Static validation is per-
formed on the AST after preprocessing and template instan-
tiation have already been performed by the clang front-end.
The Ironclad C++ validator applies simple, local checks to
type declarations and expressions. None of the checks used
by the static validator require complicated analysis.
Although currently implemented as a stand-alone check-
ing tool, an alternative implementation might be to integrate
the static validation into the compiler that is invoked with
a command line flag during compilation (much as GCC’s
-std= flag ensures the code conforms to a specific language
standard).
7. Experiences Refactoring to Ironclad C++
To evaluate the usability and applicability of Ironclad C++,
we refactored multiple performance benchmarks (from the
SPEC and Parsec suites) and an open-source key-store
database written in C++ to Ironclad C++. The open-source
database, leveldb, was developed at Google and uses cus-
tom data structures, including a skip list and a LRU cache.
Table 2 characterizes a few, key C++ language features used
by these applications and details the nature of the code
changes performed to refactor to Ironclad C++. Overall, we
void f(void*);
⇓ (Manual)
template<typename T>
void f(T*);
⇓ (Refactoring Tool)
template<typename T>
void f(ptr<T>);
Figure 5. Common refactoring to remove void* pointers.
First we manually add templates. Then the refactoring tool
adds ptrs.
were able to successfully refactor 50K lines of C/C++ code
to Ironclad C++. We performed a series of manual and au-
tomated refactoring steps to transform these programs, and
the majority of the code transformations were performed by
our semi-automatic refactoring tool (Section 7.3).
7.1 Step 1: Moving from C to C++
Ironclad C++ requires the use of a C++ compiler to com-
pile all our benchmarks. C++, unlike C, does not allow a
void* to be implicitly converted to a T*. Hence, three C
benchmarks from the SPEC benchmark suite could not be
compiled using a C++ compiler without a few manual mod-
ifications. We manually added explicit casts to the offending
expressions. In sjeng, we changed the name of a variable
named “this”, which is a C++ keyword. Once all of the
programs could be compiled using a C++ compiler, we fur-
ther modified them to use C++’s new function for allocation
rather than C’s malloc, which requires unsafe casts from
void*. To match new, we also replaced free with delete.
7.2 Step 2: Increasing Type-safety
After refactoring the code to compile with a C++ compiler
and use C++ allocation and deallocation functions, we per-
formed a few additional code modifications to prepare the
code for automated refactoring. As noted in Section 2.1,
void* pointers are not permitted by Ironclad C++. The pro-
cess of replacing void* pointers with type-safe constructs is
not generally automatable because it may require recogniz-
ing and extracting an inheritance hierarchy or adding tem-
plate parameters for more than one type. Rather than at-
tempting to perform this refactoring automatically, we in-
stead chose to manually replace occurrences of void*, as
shown in Figure 5. A few additional benchmark-specific
code modifications were necessary, but these modifications
were typically simple and did not require any deep under-
standing of the algorithms or the datastructures used in the
benchmarks. For example, lbm used an errant cast from a
double*** to a double** that was removed by correct-
ing the pointer types to allow compilation without an unsafe
cast.
7.3 Step 3: Automated Refactoring
Once we manually modified the benchmarks to use type-
safe features, we applied a custom automated refactoring
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Manual Code Changes Automated Code Changes
Benchmark Lang Class Ptrs Refs LoC C++ Alloc Pre Post Ptr Types SysFunc Alloc Casts
blackscholes C 1 20% N/A 405 0 5 4 2 5 5 4 0
bzip2 C 2 47% N/A 5731 16 41 28 14 224 21 30 30
lbm C 1 57% N/A 904 1 3 20 6 49 7 2 4
sjeng C 2 46% N/A 10544 45 24 164 158 310 82 30 0
astar C++ 25 7% 35% 4280 0 60 2 7 72 15 76 2
canneal C++ 3 27% 29% 2817 0 0 2 9 72 3 2 1
fluidanimate C++ 4 7% 7% 2785 0 1 0 2 85 7 44 1
leveldb C++ 66 49% 24% 16188 0 0 160 149 1028 69 195 33
namd C++ 15 46% 7% 3886 0 0 0 44 265 11 69 10
streamcluster C++ 5 37% 0% 1767 0 25 2 2 63 17 9 21
swaptions C++ 1 39% 0% 1095 0 11 1 12 63 3 0 9
Table 2. Characterization of the evaluated programs. From left to right, benchmark name, source language, number of class-
es/structs, % pointer declarations, % reference declarations, lines of code, manually refactored lines of code, and automatically
refactored lines of code
tool to the code. This refactoring tool performs simple au-
tomated code modifications, including modifying pointer
type declarations (T* to ptr<T>), allocation and deallo-
cation sites (new T() to new_obj<T>()), and type-casts
((T*)p to cast<T>(p)). As shown in Table 2, the majority
of the code modifications necessary to refactor C and C++
code to Ironclad C++ are performed by the refactoring tool.
The refactoring tool is meant to be used only once to aid
the initial transformation. The refactoring tool is built upon
LLVM’s Clang compiler front-end.
The refactoring tool could replace every T* with an
aptr<T>, but this would cause the resulting code to execute
unnecessary dynamic checks. Thus, the refactoring tool im-
plements a best-effort analysis similar to the whole program
pointer type inference in CCured [22] to determine whether
to replace a T* with an aptr<T> or a ptr<T>. This whole
program analysis is run once, during refactoring, and it is
not required for future validation or further manual refac-
toring. The refactoring tool analysis accounts for the use of
address-of, this, and assignments from stack allocated ar-
rays to determine which pointers require dynamic lifetime
checking (lptr and laptr). The refactoring tool also gen-
erates mark() methods for heap-precise garbage collection.
7.4 Step 4: Post-Refactoring Modifications
Considering that C++ is a large language with many cor-
ner cases, the refactoring tool does not automatically han-
dle every possible code modification. We also performed a
few manual code changes following refactoring. Given that
refactoring is intended to be performed only once, the num-
ber of lines modified post-refactoring were relatively small
in most cases. For example, our pointer type inference im-
plementation sometimes missed a nested increment opera-
tion on an array pointer and inferred that the pointer was
therefore a singleton. This error is easily caught through the
type-checking done by the C++ compiler (ptr<T> does not
overload the increment operator). A more mature iteration
of the refactoring tool would avoid these minor refactoring
errors.
Two notable outliers required more manual refactor-
ing than the rest of the refactored programs (sjeng and
leveldb). We describe the code modifications below.
sjeng In sjeng, there were 154 uses of f(&A[0]) to pass
a pointer to the first element of a stack allocated array as an
argument to a function f. In Ironclad C++, the ptr<T> con-
structed from the result of &A[0] contains no information
about the size of A and therefore assumes that is has size 1.
We modified the code to use f(A) instead, which retains the
correct array size information. Where &A[i] is used with
some non-zero index i, the A.offset(i) method provided
by the array and array pointer classes was used to create a
new array pointer with the correct offset and size.
In addition, the gen function to stores a pointer to a stack
allocated array in a global variable, which is not permitted in
Ironclad C++. This global variable is set on each entry to the
gen function and used by other functions that were called
from gen. In place of the unsafe use of the global variable,
we modified the code to simply pass the pointer parameter
from gen to the rest of the functions that required it. This
change was conceptually straightforward but required mod-
ifying 137 lines of code.
leveldb leveldb required to a larger number of manual
code modifications compared to the benchmarks with fewer
total lines of code. In particular, the Slice class in leveldb
contains a constructor that accepts a const char *. Refac-
toring this constructor to Ironclad C++ converts the param-
eter to type aptr<const char>. However, in cases where
a string literal was originally used to call a function with a
Slice parameter, the Ironclad C++ code required more than
the one implicit user-defined conversion allowed by the C++
standard [15]. Thus, we added an explicit conversion from
string literals to aptr<const char> at each call site.
7.5 Step 5: Performance Tuning
Finally, we identified modifications to three of the bench-
mark programs as examples of the sort of performance tun-
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ing that can reduce the performance penalty of providing
memory safety.
bzip2 In bzip2, the generateMTFValues function cre-
ates a temporary pointer to a stack allocated array in a doubly
nested loop. In the Ironclad C++ version of this code, the
temporary pointer becomes an laptr, which must initial-
ize its lowerBound on each iteration of the outer loop. Fur-
ther, the temporary pointer was used in pointer arithmetic,
which is relatively expensive (compared to array indexing)
for Ironclad C++ aptr and laptr types. To improve the
performance of this code, we replaced the temporary pointer
with an integer index and used array indexing off of the orig-
inal stack allocated array instead of pointer arithmetic on the
temporary. This optimization reduced the normalized run-
time from 1.53x to 1.35x.
streamcluster The streamcluster benchmark spends
the majority of its runtime in the distance function, which
computes the pointwise distance between two vectors. Due
to the use of a tight for-loop with repeated indexing into
the input vectors, our initial Ironclad C++ version of this
benchmark suffered from unnecessarily high bounds check-
ing overheads. To reduce this overhead, we replaced the loop
with a call to a reduce function, provided by the Ironclad
C++ library, that simply bounds checks the start and end in-
dices of the reduction on both input arrays, and then runs the
computation at unchecked speeds. With this optimization,
the streamcluster benchmark executes with no measur-
able overhead compared to the original.
swaptions Swaptions spends most of its runtime per-
forming operations on vectors and matrices of floating
pointer numbers. For matrix structures, swaptions uses an
array-of-array-pointers to approximate a two-dimensional
array (i.e., aptr<aptr<double>>). These structures are
inefficient in two ways. First, creating the structure re-
quires multiple memory allocations. Second, due to the
additional metadata used by aptr, each two-dimensional
index operation (i.e., A[i][j]) must first load the ad-
dress, current index, and size stored in the first level array
and then load the double stored in the second level array.
We replaced the aptr<aptr<double>> structures with a
matrix<double>. The matrix class provides a proper two-
dimensional array by overloading operator() (unsigned
int x, unsigned int y). In this way, the matrix class
performs two bounds checks (one on each index) and then
returns the data, avoiding the additional indirection required
by the aptr<aptr<double>> structure. This optimization
reduced the runtime overhead from 1.67x to 1.45x.
7.6 Libraries
The C++ STL The C++ Standard Template Library (STL)
provides common containers and algorithms. The under-
lying implementations of these containers use unchecked
pointer operations and are not safe by default. Only a few
of our benchmarks used the STL (canneal and leveldb),
so instead of refactoring the entire STL (approximately 100k
lines of code) to conform to Ironclad C++, we modified
key parts of the STL to emulate the checking that a fully
refactored version would perform. We performed four ma-
jor modifications on the containers used in our benchmarks.
First, we changed the default allocator to be the gc allocator.
Second, we inserted bounds checks on all array operations,
including the indexing operators for string and vector.
Third, we modified methods that accepted or returned raw
pointers to instead use Ironclad C++ smart pointers. Finally,
we modified the iterators to each container to avoid access-
ing invalid memory. For string and vector, this was as
simple as replacing the raw pointer iterator with an aptr.
For map and set, we modified the tree_iterator to avoid
iterating past the root or end nodes of the tree.
External Libraries Ideally, library source-code would also
be refactored to Ironclad C++, but we acknowledge that it
may not always be feasible. In such cases, Ironclad C++ pro-
tects what it can, while begrudgingly allowing the program
to call unsafe library code through methods on the smart
pointer classes that allow the underlying raw pointer to be
passed to a library call. This functionality is provided for
the case where refactoring is not possible, similarly to how
Java provides the JNI for access to unsafe C/C++ code. This
behavior is optional and can be disabled.
7.7 Bug Detection Effectiveness
As a coarse sanity check on the implementation of the Iron-
clad C++ library, we tested Ironclad C++ on multiple suites
of known bugs, including selected programs from BugBench
(gzip, man, ncompress, and polymorph) [19], thirty array-
out-of-bounds vulnerability test cases from the NIST Juliet
Suite [23], and the Wilander test suite [30]. As expected,
Ironclad C++ safely aborted on all buggy inputs. We note
that these tests are not definitive proof of Ironclad C++’s
soundness or correctness, of course.
8. Experimental Evaluation
The previous section established the feasibility of bringing
full type and memory safety to C++ at the cost of refac-
toring programs to follow to the Ironclad C++ rules, but it
did not evaluate the performance and memory usage cost of
enforcing such safety at runtime. This section describes our
prototype implementation and presents runtime overhead re-
sults, including experiments to isolate the overhead added by
the various aspects of Ironclad C++. In addition, we present
results that indicated the overheads from garbage collec-
tion are low, that heap-precise collection reduces memory
consumption versus purely conservative collection, and dy-
namic lifetime checking is faster than heapification.
8.1 Implementation and Experimental Methods
We use the programs refactored and optimized in the pre-
vious section (from the SPEC benchmark suite, the Parsec
benchmark suite, and an open-source database—leveldb)
to evaluate the runtime overheads of enforcing safety. The
benchmarks were compiled using llvm/clang version 3.2,
and our test system contains an Intel 2.66Ghz Core2 proces-
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Figure 6. Normalized runtimes for (adding checking from left to right) refactored Ironclad C++ code with no checking, bounds
checked arrays, safe stack allocations, safe heap allocations, and heap-precise garbage collection.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 M
em
. U
sa
ge
Translated Bounds Bounds + Stack Bounds + Stack + GC Bounds + Stack + H-P GC
astar blackscholes bzip2 canneal fluidanimate lbm ldb-fseq ldb-rreverse ldb-rhot namd sjeng stcluster swaptions average
Figure 7. Normalized memory usage for Ironclad C++ code with (from left to right) bounds checking metadata, bounds and
stack checking metadata, both metadata with conservative GC, and both metadata with heap-precise GC.
sor. The Ironclad C++ library includes implementations of
the various smart pointer classes and safe versions of various
C standard library functions. We modified the libcxx STL
implementation to provide safe iterators, bounds-checked
array access operations, and interfaces that accept and re-
turn smart pointers instead of raw pointers. To reduce
overhead, the smart pointer implementation uses clang’s
always_inline function attribute to ensure the compiler
inlines the dereference and indexing operators. We imple-
mented the heap-precise collector by extending the Boehm-
Demers-Weiser conservative garbage collector [7] to use the
marking algorithm described in Section 3. We used Val-
grind’s Massif tool to measure memory usage overheads.
8.2 Overall Performance
The overall performance overhead for bringing type and
memory safety to the refactored programs is just 12% on
average. Figure 6 shows these results, and it also includes re-
sults for multiple configurations to show the impact of each
aspect of Ironclad C++. The left-most bar in each group
(“Translated”) shows that the performance of the original
codes is the same as that of the refactored, strongly typed
benchmarks when dynamic bound checking, dynamic life-
time checking, and the garbage collector are all disabled.
These results indicate that there is negligible overhead from
replacing raw pointers with smart pointers. The second bar
from the left in each group of Figure 6 (“Bounds”) shows
that the performance overhead of bounds checking is respon-
sible for almost all of the 12% overall performance over-
head.
8.3 Overheads of Garbage Collection
Figure 6 shows that the runtime overhead of garbage col-
lection is negligible in our benchmarks. Although perhaps
surprising, our benchmarks are not typical of programs used
in garbage collection studies, which are generally selected
for their frequent allocation behavior. For example several of
our benchmarks allocate memory only during initialization
and never deallocate any memory—resulting in extremely
rare collection invocation (less than once per second for
many benchmarks). The benchmark that collects most fre-
quently (six hundred times per second), swaptions, incurs
an additional 23% performance penalty due to garbage col-
lection.
The garbage collector increases memory usage by 14%
on average and up to 85% for leveldb-fillseq (Figure 7)
when compared to explicit deallocation with the same un-
derlying memory allocator. One caveat is that the allocator
underlying the conservative collector uses more space on av-
erage than clang’s default memory allocator (by 29%) even
when operating in explicit memory deallocation mode; if
this overhead is included, the total memory overhead of GC
rises to 43% (not shown on Figure 7).
8.4 Benefits of Heap-Precise Collection
Figure 7 also shows the impact of Ironclad’s heap-precise
extension to the garbage collector. In most cases, the heap-
precise collector provides no appreciable reduction of mem-
ory usage, but in two cases — astar and leveldb-fillseq
— the pure-conservative collector suffers due to imprecise
identification of heap pointers. When applying heap-precise
collection, these programs’ memory usage is reduced by
28% and 66%, respectively, compared to the unmodified
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conservative collector. The memory overheads of bzip2 and
namd do not improve under heap-precise collection due to
stack-allocated arrays (which are not tagged) with elements
that are misidentified as pointers. The overall average mem-
ory overhead of GC vs. explicit memory allocation drops
from 14% to 9% with the addition of heap-precise collec-
tion.
We observe a 2% runtime overhead increase for heap-
precise garbage collection due to data layout changes from
the inclusion of virtual pointers in each tagged allocation.
This hypothesis was confirmed by tagging allocations but
using the completely conservative collector, which yielded
the same runtime overheads.
8.5 Benefits of Dynamic Lifetime Checking
Dynamic lifetime checking incurs less than 1% overhead
over the baseline of providing no safety checking for stack
deallocation. We originally observed overheads of 17% in
bzip2, but these overheads were due to the creation of an
laptr temporary in a tight loop. The optimization described
in Section 7.5 eliminated the overhead from dynamic life-
time checking in bzip2.
In Figure 8, we compare dynamic lifetime checking to
the other notable alternative for stack allocation safety:
heapification. On average, heapification is 2x slower than
dynamic lifetime checking. We observed two situations in
which heapification lead to increased performance over-
heads: a stack-allocated array escaping to a function (oc-
curs in sjeng) and calling a method on a stack-allocated
object (occurs in leveldb). As a result, dynamic lifetime
checking is faster than heapification by 27.5x (sjeng), 6.2x
(ldb-fseq), 9.1x (ldb-rreverse), and 6.4x (ldb-rhot).
In almost all cases, dynamic lifetime checking avoids the
use of heapification for enforcing stack deallocation safety.
The runtime performance of dynamic lifetime checking is
nearly identical to the performance of code with no safety
checking for stack deallocation.
8.6 Summary
Ironclad C++ enforces comprehensive memory safety for
C++ at an average runtime overhead of 12%. Without heap-
precise garbage collection, Ironclad C++ incurs a memory
overhead of 14%. Heap-precise garbage collection mitigates
a few of the worst-case benchmarks for conservative col-
lection and further reduces the memory overhead to 9%.
By avoiding heapification, Ironclad C++’s dynamic lifetime
checking provides a 2x speedup over heapified code. It may
be possible to further reduce the overheads of memory safety
in Ironclad C++ through additional source-level refactorings
similar to those demonstrated in Section 7.5, compiler opti-
mization, or static analysis.
9. Conclusion
Ironclad C++ brings type safety to C++ at a runtime over-
head of 12%. We demonstrated the feasibility of refactor-
ing C and C++ code to Ironclad C++ with the help of a
semi-automatic refactoring tool. With heap-precise garbage
collection, Ironclad C++ provides an optional interface for
precisely identifying heap pointers, which was shown to de-
crease average memory usage of garbage collection. We in-
vestigated both heapification and dynamic lifetime check-
ing for enforcing stack deallocation safety and found that
dynamic lifetime checking offered flexibility, memory con-
trol, and limited source code modifications as compared to
heapification. Overall, our experiences and experimental re-
sults indicate that Ironclad C++ has the potential to be an
effective, low-overhead, and pragmatic approach for bring-
ing comprehensive memory safety to C++.
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